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Abstract
We introduce a new formal approach to social networks
in order to distinguish four ways in which coalitions change.
First, the agents in the network change. Second, dependen-
cies among the agents change, for example due to addition
or removal of powers and goals of the agents. Third, norms
can introduce normative dependencies for obligations and
prohibitions. Fourth, coalitions can change due to internal
processes. We propose a number of stability measures to
identify each one of the four proposed sources of coalitions’
dynamics and the consequences they induce on the stability
of coalitions.
1. Introduction
Coalitions play a central role in social reasoning, and
thus various theories have been used and developed in mul-
tiagent systems. For example, coalitional game theory has
been adopted from economics and extended for multiagent
systems [6], [7], and social networks have been adopted
from social sciences and modified to represent dependence
networks among agents [8], [4], [5]. These theories differ in
various ways. For example, in the former, potential coalitions
may be seen as sets of agents while in the latter, dependence
networks can be seen as criteria for proposing/accepting
to form coalitions [8], or potential coalitions are viewed
as sets of dependencies (the dependencies represent the
contract of the potential coalition) [5]. Moreover, in the
former various notions of stability are defined, whereas in
the latter they are not. In this paper, we address the question
how to distinguish and model the different reasons behind
the change of coalitions in requirements analysis.
Possible reasons behind these changes are due to oper-
ations of addition and removal of the components of our
model such as agents, dependencies among agents, norma-
tive dependencies concerning normative goals and powers.
More precisely, how do we measure the evolution and the
changes of a coalition over time in terms of:
Changes of the agents and dependencies. We distinguish
two kinds of uses for dependence networks: global use in
software engineering where the designer models all stake-
holders [2], and social simulation where no such assumption
is made [8]. In the former, game theory can be used for
reasoning about social interaction, in the latter simulation
methods are used. We follow the tradition of TROPOS [2]
for requirements analysis, as formalized by Sauro [5] and
close to qualitative game theories developed by Wooldridge
et al. [1], not the latter [8].
Changes of the dependencies related to norms.Norms
are used for the dynamics of dependence networks, which
explained why they have not been considered thus far in
the static dependence networks [9]. A norm analytically
implies that agents (intend to) execute them, and therefore
leads to dependencies among agents just like the original
goal-based dependencies studied by Sichman and Conte [9].
Norms should be clearly distinguished from obligations.
More precisely, norms are used to generate new dependence
networks in which a number of dependencies are normative
ones. Within a dependence network, the effect of the norm
consists in a normative goal such as an obligation. These
normative goals, i.e., obligations, are treated just like goals
derived from the agent’s desires. The coalitions which may
emerge depend on the dependencies among the agents, so
since norms change the dependencies among agents, they
also change the coalitions which will emerge.
Internal dynamics. Changes of the coalition itself in terms
of goal-based and norm-based dependencies composing the
coalition, e.g., an agent is excluded from a coalition because
of a malicious behaviour.
We call the last kind of change internal dynamics to
distinguish it from the other dynamics related to the ad-
dition or deletion of agents or goal-based and norm-based
dependencies. They represent the case in which the network
remains the same, involving the same agents and dependen-
cies, but the composition of the coalition changes, including
new dependencies or excluding the old ones. A simple and
intuitive common sense example of the above presented
changes can be the next one. Consider a soccer team as
a coalition. It can change because new players come in, or
players retire. It can change, because agents acquire new
abilities or loose abilities, e.g., they loose their form, they
break a leg, and so on, or get new goals, e.g., they want
to play in the national team. Concerning norms, there can
be the obligation set by the trainer for a player to play in
the left wing position. Concerning internal dynamics, there
may be a malicious behavior of a player, e.g., he gets too
many red cards since he is too aggressive and he is no longer
allowed to play. In the paper, we explain the changes using
a grid-based running example.
From the multiagent systems field, we use the normative
multiagent paradigm while from social network theory we
take the idea of defining graph theoretic measures. Concern-
ing measures, we define measures associated to the number
of agents and the number of goal-based dependencies present
in each time instant, counting the number of norm-based
dependencies in each time instant and counting the changes
in the dependencies composing coalitions. Our measures are
unified in an average measure returning coalitions’ stability
depending on the differences between values associated to
consecutive time instants.
In this paper, we do not give a formal ontology but
we define indications of the possible changes of coalitions.
Moreover, we do not perform any simulation as in Carley’s
dynamic networks analysis [3]. This paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 presents a grid-based scenario. Section
3 and 4 present the key concepts of our metamodel and
the three coalitions’ changes in detail. Related work and
conclusions end the paper.
2. Changing coalitions in a GRID scenario
We use the following example of a coalition in a grid envi-
ronment. Inside a virtual organization (VO), local coalitions
may be formed in order to cooperate to achieve shared goals
such as, i.e., computations and storage of satellites’ data.
We depict a section of the VO composed by five nodes,
as in Figure 1.a, following the legend of Figure 3. The
VO is composed by four nodes connected to each other
by dependencies based both on goals and on norms and
nodes a, b and c form a local coalition. Considering goal-
based dependencies, node b depends on node a to save the
file satellite.jpg, node c depends on node b to save the file
satellite.mpeg and node c depends on node d to run the file
results.mat, since they are not able to perform their goals
alone. Considering norm-based dependencies, instead, node
a depends on node c to have the permission to open the file
dataJune.mat while node c is obliged to give to node b the
results of the running of file mining.mat.
The first kind of change of coalitions in the grid scenario
follows directly from the grid metaphor. Computers can
be connected to the grid like electrical machines can be
connected to the power net. So the computers connected
to the grid changes frequently, e.g., node e. If they do so,
then also the coalition changes. How frequently they change
is our first measure.
Figure 1. Grid network:C={a, b, c};C={a, b, c, d}.
The second kind of change concerns goal-based depen-
dencies. Node b fulfilled the goal of node c to save the
file satellite.mpeg. This dependency does not hold anymore
and it is deleted, as shown in Figure 1.b. This deletion of
dependencies changes the structure of the local coalition
because of now the reciprocity involves also node d inside
the system. The deletion, as the addition, of a goal-based
dependency may cause a change in the coalitions composed
by these dependencies.
The third kind of change is related with security. A node
has a number of private information, e.g., a unique access
to its pc. If another node has the necessity to access to it,
it has to ask the first node the permission, e.g., a login and
a password, as in the norm-based dependency among nodes
a and c. Obligations, instead, are due to particular services
provided by the nodes. The obligation is represented as a
dependency, as in the case of the norm-based dependency
among nodes d and b, and it is removed if the obligation is no
more active in the system. Figure 2.a shows the introduction
of a norm-based dependency representing the obligation for
node b to give the access to file finalres.txt to node a.
Figure 2. Grid network: C={a, b, c, d};C={a, b, c}.
The fourth kind of change, internal changes of coali-
tions, represents changes in the composition of the coalition
because of internal reasons. In Grid networks, malicious
behaviors can be recognized, e.g., in case of attacks or for
not properly following the protocol, and malicious nodes can
be excluded from further interactions with the other nodes,
as shown in Figure 2.b.
3. The model
3.1. The model definition
Our modeling approach aims to provide a design method-
ology both for multiagent systems and social systems, based
on the normative multiagent paradigm. We present our
model as a tuple composed by the concepts of agents,
goals, norms and time. This notions are represented in our
dependency modeling as nodes or dependency relations be-
tween these entities. For more details about the dependency
modeling, see Villata [10]. Our model can be represented as
follows:
Definition 1: 〈A, G, N, T, D, D ⊆ A × A × G, T →
2A, T → 2D, N → 2D, C ⊆ 2D, N ⊆ C〉 consists in a
set of agents A, a set of goals G, a set of norms N , a
set of time instants T and a set of dependencies D. Every
time instant is related to the set of agents and to the set of
dependencies D present in the system in that instant. Norms
are represented as a subset of dependencies. A coalition is
represented as a set of dependencies and a subset of the
dependencies composing a coalition can be represented by
norms.
In this model, a coalition can be represented by a set
of dependencies, represented by C(a, B, G) where a is an
agent, B is a set of agents and G is a set of goals. Intuitively,
the coalition agrees that for each C(a, B, G) part of the
coalition, the set of agents B will see to the goal G of agent
a. Otherwise, the set of agents B may be removed from the
coalition or be sanctioned.
In a multiagent system, since an agent is put into a system
that involves also other agents, he can be supported by the
others to achieve his own goals if he is not able to do them
alone. This leads to the concept of power representing the
capability of a group of agents (possibly composed only
by one agent) to achieve some goals (theirs or of other
agents) performing some actions without the possibility to
be obstructed. The power of a group of agents is defined as
follows:
Definition 2 (Agents’ power): 〈A, G, power : 2A →
22
G
〉 where A is a set of agents, G is a set of goals. The
function power relates with each set S ⊆ A of agents the
sets of goals G1S , . . . , GmS they can achieve.
Definitions 1 and 2 have the aim to explain how social
dependence networks can be seen as multiagent systems.
The notion of power is relevant for our methodology since
it represents the social basis for the development of our
model based on the methodology of dependence networks
as developed by Conte and Sichman [9]. In this model, an
agent is described by a set of prioritized goals, and there is
a global dependence relation that explicates how an agent
depends on other agents for fulfilling its goals. For example,
dep({a, b}, {c, d}) = {{g1, g2}, {g3}} expresses that the set
of agents {a, b} depends on the set of agents {c, d} to see
to their goals {g1, g2} or {g3}. A dependence network is
defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Dependence Networks (DN)): A
dependence network is a tuple 〈A, G, dep,≥〉 where:
• A is a set of agents and G is a set of goals;
• dep : 2A × 2A → 22G is a function that relates with
each pair of sets of agents all the sets of goals on which
the first depends on the second.
• ≥: A → 2G× 2G is for each agent a total pre-order on
goals which occur in his dependencies: G1 ≥ (a)G2
implies that ∃B, C ⊆ A such that a ∈ B and G1, G2 ∈
depend(B, C).
The dependency modeling represents our modeling ac-
tivity consisting in the identification of the dependencies
among the agents. Our dependency modeling is represented
as a directed labeled graph whose nodes are instances of the
concepts of the metamodel, e.g., agents, goals, and whose
arcs are instances of the notions representing relationships
between them such as goal-based dependency and norm-
based dependency. A graphical representation of the model
obtained following this modeling activity is depicted in the
legend of Figure 3. Open and closed arrows are used to
provide an immediate graphical representation of coalitions.
4. Coalitions’ Dynamics
In this section, we present a definition of coalition based
on the structure of dependence network and how to use
these different kinds of dependencies to model and measure
coalitions’ dynamics. In our model, a coalition is defined as
follows:
Definition 4 (Coalition): Let A be a set of agents and G
be a set of goals. A coalition function is a partial function
C : A × 2A × 2G such that {a | C(a, B, G)} = {b | b ∈
B, C(a, B, G)}, the set of agents profiting from the coalition
is the set of agents contributing to it. Let 〈A, G, dep,≥〉 be
a social dependence network, a coalition function C is a
coalition if ∃a ∈ A, B ⊆ A, G′ ⊆ G such that C(a, B, G′)
implies G′ ∈ dep(a, B).
As introduced before, we can model and measure coali-
tions’ dynamics over time in terms of: changes of the agents
and goal-based dependencies, changes of the dependencies
related to norms and changes inside the coalition itself.
4.1. Agent and dependencies’ changes
The first kind of change is due to agents entering or
leaving the multiagent system we model or to the depen-
dencies added or deleted depending on the fulfillment of
the related goal or the presence of the power to fulfill this
goal. In our model, we distinguish two different kinds of
goals, achievement goals and maintenance goals. In con-
tracts goals are typically achievement ones while, in game
theoretical approaches, coalitions are typically concerned
with maintenance goals. In this paper, we assume that goals
are maintenance goals rather than achievement ones, which
give us automatically a longer term and a more dynamic
perspective to define the evolution of coalitions and thus
their stability. Moreover, our model aims to distinguish
and represent not only short term situations such as, for
example, a virtual meeting on Second Life but also long
term situations as, for example, the work of a particular
department or office or, in the Grid scenario, the work of a
virtual organization for e-Research.
We can define two measures associated to the number of
agents and the number of goal-based dependencies present in
each time instant. The first measure calculates the ratio be-
tween the number of agents added and removed in a particu-
lar time instant depending and the number of agents present
at the previous time instant. The second measure calculates
the ratio between the number of goal-based dependencies
added and deleted in a particular time instant depending
and the number of goal-based dependencies present at the
previous time instant. The measures are defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Agents and Dependencies Measures): Let i
be a time frame, NAgenti is given by the number of agents
entering the system A+i and leaving the system A
−
i , depend-
ing on the total number of agents Ai−1 present at time frame
i− 1:
N
Agent
i =
∑( A+i
Ai−1
)
+
∑( A−i
Ai−1
)
Let i be a time frame, NDepi is given by the number
of goal-based dependencies added to the network D+i and
deleted form the network D−i , depending on the total
number of goal-based dependencies Di−1 present at time
frame i− 1:
N
Dep
i =
∑( D+i
Di−1
)
+
∑( D−i
Di−1
)
Example 1: In Figure 3, we present the case of six time
frames visualizing the evolution of a coalition. In the first
time frame, we have five agents and a coalition involving
agents a, b, c, as shown by the dependencies composing it.
There are also two norm-based dependencies and three goal-
based dependencies. The passage from the first instant t1 to
the second one shows the deletion of agent e. From instant
t2 to instant t3, we observe the deletion of the goal-based
dependency connecting agents c and b. Also the coalition
changes and it is formed by all the four agents. From instant
t3 to instant t4, the situation changes back to the original
configuration but the coalition is fixed. From instant t4 to
instant t5, agent d disappears, a norm-based dependency is
deleted and the coalition changes its actors, involving now
a, b and c. From instant t5 to instant t6, the situation cames
back to the situation of instant t4.
4.2. Norms’ changes
The second kind of change is due to norms and, in par-
ticular, to obligations. An obligation is a requirement which
must be fulfilled to take some course of action, whether
legal or moral. Normative reasoning is strictly related to
norms’ changes and the definition of a representation and a
measure for them allows to do it. The norm sets a particular
kind of dependency among two agents. This dependency can
be deleted if the obligation is fulfilled or a new obligation
can be inserted into the system to regulate its behaviour.
In our model, we distinguish, represent and measure both
short term contracts, e.g., a transaction on e-Bay such as an
agreement carried out between separate entities involving the
exchange of items of value as goods and money, and long
term contracts, e.g., the marriage contract which hopefully
lasts forever.
We can define a measure associated to the number of
norm-based dependencies present in each time instant. This
measure calculates the ratio between the number of norm-
based dependencies added and deleted to each time instant
depending and the total number of norm-based dependencies
present in that time instant. The measure is defined as
follows:
Definition 6 (Norms Measure): Let i be a time frame,
NNormi is given by the number of norm-based dependencies
added to the network O+i and deleted form the network O
−
i ,
depending on the total number of norm-based dependencies
Oi−1 present at time frame i− 1:
NNormi =
∑( O+i
Oi−1
)
+
∑( O−i
Oi−1
)
Example 2: In Figure 4, we model three time instants. In
the first time instant t1, we have a coalition formed by all the
four agents, three goal-based dependencies and two norm-
based dependencies. From time instant t1 to time instant
t2, the norm-based dependency involving agents d and b is
removed due to the removal of the normative goal or the
removal of the associated power. From time instant t2 to
time instant t3, a new norm-based dependency is set due
to the insertion of a new normative goal or the associated
normative power.
Figure 4. Norms’ change.
Figure 3. Agents and dependencies’ change.
4.3. Coalitions’ changes
The third kind of change is related to changes inside the
coalition itself, e.g., an agent is excluded from a coalition
because of a malicious behaviour. This third kind of change
is the only one related to the coalition itself and it has
to represent and measure the changes in the composition
of each coalition of the system. We define a measure
which calculates the ratio between the number of the goal-
based and norm-based dependencies composing the coalition
in each time instant and the dependencies composing the
coalition in the previous time instant, as follows:
Definition 7 (Coalitions Measure): Let i be a time frame,
NCoali is given by the number of norm-based and goal-based
dependencies of a coalition added to the network (D+i +
O+i ) ∈ Ci and deleted from the network (D
−
i + O
−
i ) ∈ Ci
depending on the total number of norm-based and goal-based
dependencies composing the coalition (Di−1 + Oi−1) ∈
Ci−1 at time frame i− 1:
N
Coal
i
=
∑( (D+
i
+ O+
i
)Ci
(Di−1 + Oi−1)Ci−1
)
+
∑( (D−
i
+ O−
i
)Ci
(Di−1 + Oi−1)Ci−1
)
Example 3: Consider the coalition depicted in time in-
stant t1 of Figure 5. The coalition is composed by agents
a, b and c. The passage from time instant t1 to time instant
t2 sees the addition inside the coalition of agent d due to
the reciprocity-based principle of coalition formation. From
time instant t2 to time instant t3, agent d is excluded from
the coalition, without any change in the number or type of
the dependencies composing the coalition itself. This can
depend, as said, on a malicious behaviour of the excluded
agent.
Figure 5. Coalitions’ change.
The above measures are defined for one time moment
only. We can unify these measures for a sequence of
dependence networks associating to each time instant the
average number of changes. We can define this measure as
follows:
Definition 8 (Changes Measures): Let i be a time frame
of a sequence of social dependence networks, the measure of
the changes’ average is given by the fraction of the sum of
the single measures and the number of available measures:
N
Agent
i + N
Dep
i + N
Norm
i + N
Coal
i
measures
Measures of example 1 vary as shown in Table 1.
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
NAgent
i
0/5 1/5 0/4 0/4 1/4 1/3
NDep
i
0/3 0/3 1/3 1/2 1/3 1/2
NNormi 0/2 0/2 0/2 0/2 1/2 1/1
NCoal
i
0/3 0/3 3/3 0/4 3/4 3/3
Changes 0 0, 05 0, 33 0, 12 0, 55 0, 85
Table 1. Measures of Figure 3
Thanks to the changes measure, we underline that the
two time frames with the main changes in comparison
with their previous time frame are t3 and t5, as can be
supposed observing the relative figure. It can be noted that
in our measures the deletion of a component increases the
difference of the changes measure associated to two time
frames in a row while the addition of these components
causes a minor change. This behaviour is due to the relation
of our measure with the game theoretical approaches for
defining stability: the stability is maintained in order to avoid
the breaking off of the agents from the grand coalition and
form their own group.
We choose the simplest possible measures that capture the
stability of the networks, because they represent all possible
changes can be performed in the composition of coalitions
and of the networks. When the average of the measures for a
sequence of dependence networks presents a great difference
in the values of two connected time instants, it underlines a
lack of stability while when the average presents a small or
inexistent difference between two connected time instants,
the stability of the coalition and of the network in general is
maintained. Moreover, the measures now only give a global
indication of the stability of agents, dependencies, norms and
coalitions. We could also measure whether changes in agents
and dependencies coincides with changes in the coalition
thanks to our four measures.
5. Related Work
In a multiagent perspective, a coalition can be viewed
under two different representational frameworks. The first
one regards cooperative game theory. Cooperative game
theory studies those games in which players are able to make
binding agreements with the aim to achieve a collective ben-
efit. This approach is strictly related to the field of economics
and various approaches of this kind have been presented in
literature as, for example, the work of Shehory and Kraus
[6]. The second perspective is based on the theory of the so-
cial power and dependence pioneered by Castelfranchi [4] as
starting point and then developed in the context of coalition
formation by Sichman [8] and Sauro [5]. This involves the
development of a social reasoning mechanism that analyzes
the possibility to profit from mutual-dependencies, e.g., two
agents depend on each other for the satisfaction of a shared
goal, or reciprocal-dependencies, e.g., two agents depend on
each other for the satisfaction of two different goals. Both
these two approaches present the following problems: they
do not provide a modeling technique to represent coalitions’
dynamics and to distinguish them.
6. Conclusions
We present a model to represent, at each time instant, the
state of the system in terms of agents, goals, norms and
the dependencies relating all these concepts. This model
allows the distinction and measure of the possible coali-
tions’ dynamics. In particular, we distinguish among three
different kinds of coalitions’ changes: changes based on
addition or deletion of agents or goal-based dependencies,
changes based on the addition or deletion of norm-based
dependencies and changes on the internal structure of the
coalition itself. It can be observed that with a more detailed
model we could make more detailed and precise distinctions
between the four kinds of changes. However, often we
only have the given information, for example in systems’
design, and we already would like to do this kind of
analysis on these models. This is precisely where graph-
theoretical social network techniques are useful. We combine
these techniques with the normative multiagent paradigm
introducing in the networks norm-based dependencies. The
strength of this combination consists in building a modeling
technique able to represent in an intuitive way not only
the inter-relationships among the actors of the system but
also external constraints such as norms and, particularly,
obligations, e.g., in our Grid scenario. The main difficulty
of this approach consists in the creation of a common model
without simplifying too much the two original frameworks.
Moreover, we introduce four measures aiming to measure
these changes inside the networks to each time instant and
an average measure to compute the stability of a sequence
of dependence networks. Our model allows to measure
coalitions’ dynamics in terms of changing dependencies,
agents and coalitions, distinguishing also among goal-based
dependencies and norm-based ones. Using dependence net-
works as methodology to model a system advantages us from
different points of view. First, they are abstract, thus they
can be used for conceptual modeling, simulation, design and
formal analysis. Second, they are used in high level design
languages, like TROPOS [2], thus they can be used also in
software implementation.
Concerning future work, we are working on a definition
of coalitions’ stability in our model, based on the presented
measures, because of a lack of a definition of this notion
in the field of social network theory. The notion of stability
in our model can be identified intuitively in the absence
of coalitions’ changes we described but it is necessary to
provide a formal definition of this notion and to associate it
a measure able to represent it. Moreover, we start to simulate
the use of our model and its associated measures in order to
provide quantitative results based on our approach, similarly
to social network theory approaches.
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